Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy
Volume 34

Number 1

Article 9

2012

Exploring Psychology and Religious Experience: Relevant Issues
and Core Questions
Mauro Properzi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/irp

Recommended Citation
Properzi, Mauro (2012) "Exploring Psychology and Religious Experience: Relevant Issues and Core
Questions," Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy: Vol. 34 : No. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/irp/vol34/iss1/9

This Article or Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy by an authorized editor of BYU
ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Exploring Psychology and Religious Experience

Properzi

Exploring Psychology and Religious Experience: Relevant
Issues and Core Questions
Mauro Properzi

Religious experience often involves what is perceived to be divine communication to single individuals or to humanity at large. Yet, since revelatory experiences involve both a supernatural source of truth and a human receptor
who interprets and filters the message, psychology may appropriately play a role in the study and analysis of these
phenomena. In this essay I provide some general suggestions on how psychology may contribute to the study of revelatory religious experiences, namely by exploring the descriptive, the pragmatic, and the functional-psychoanalytic
dimensions of revelation. Indeed, by moving away from reductivist explanations and by framing analyses in the
transcendent theological schemata of religious adepts psychology may assist the believer in sifting through the authentic and the inauthentic or between the human and the divine. In this context, this article focuses more on those
core philosophical issues and questions that ground dialogue between psychology and religion than it does on specific
examples and illustrations. It is a starting point for conversation and a broad optimistic framing of a historically
difficult relationship, which still requires much sorting out.

I

t is puzzling that scholars of religion have not yet
reached a firm consensus in defining what lies at the
very foundation of their analysis. Indeed, depending on
the scientific framework employed (whether historical,
anthropological, psychological, philosophical, etc.) different scholars emphasize one particular aspect over others
when stating or implying a working definition of religion
(Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009). Yet, it seems that at least
one aspect ought to be underlined as one of religion’s
core components, without which it is difficult to justify
labeling a belief, practice, or experience as religious. This
aspect is what several religions call revelation, as well as

its more nuanced associate inspiration, which usually is
understood to be more accessible to non-prophetic individuals and to be more mediated in its lesser quality
or intensity vis-à-vis revelation. In fact, regardless of the
term used by a particular religion to describe this phenomenon, it is common for most religious perspectives
to affirm that a Supreme Being, or even a depersonalMauro Properzi, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Religion at Brigham
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ized universe or force, is a communicative subject that, at
some point or another, manifests its will, power, characteristics, and love to humanity. Whether these messages
are understood and heeded is a different matter, but what
concerns us at this stage is the fact that most religions
share the belief that something transcending humanity
speaks to us and solicits our response.
To be sure, the manner and timing of these divine
communications are as varied and distinct as are religious denominations. Broadly speaking, Christianity
recognizes Christ’s Incarnation as the supreme and most
immediate act of divine revelation. At the same time,
because it shares a scriptural foundation with Judaism,
Christianity accepts revelatory communications through
the prophets of the Old Testament. Islam contributes to
this prophetic picture by honoring Muhammad as its
own prophet and the Koran as divine communication.
But prophets and the incarnated Christ are not the only
sources of transcendent messages in the universe. Most
religions view the Creation as the manifestation of a
Creator, thus deriving a natural theology from observing
their surroundings or the order and beauty of our planet.
Furthermore, many religions place humanity in a unique
or supreme position among the creations, a position emphasized by the notion of human beings possessing an
inner core—whether conceptualized as the Muslim Fitra or the Christian Imago Dei—that is especially revealing of God’s will and nature.1 In other words, the divine
speaks both externally and internally to the human being, a distinction that often parallels the distinction between revelation and inspiration.

promptings of an inspiring or confirming nature that
may be interpreted as having an external source or origin. In other words, the subjective and the objective unavoidably interact, and they do so in religious matters as
they do in all behaviors. Indeed, the purely logical being
who reasons and acts only according to perfect formulas
of truth does not exist and is a mere illusion. To be human is to interact with information in such a way as to
make it humanly relevant, or to apply it to beings who
are social, rational, emotional, spiritual, and mortal.2
At the same time, to stress the unavoidable interaction of the objective and the subjective is not the same
as to advocate a relative or arbitrary dimension of truth.
Instead, the focus on the interaction perhaps recognizes
in the first place that truth is always wider than that
which can be subjectively digested by a single individual.
Indeed, truth includes multiple subjective interactions
with various external objective realities that give rise to
several formulations of that one truth (Pareyson, 2009).
Within the realm of the study of religion and its relationship with psychology, the interaction of the objective
and the subjective is an issue of no minor significance. In
fact, distortions of truth are inevitable when one dimension is emphasized excessively to the detriment of the
other. Hence, it is possible to identify several instances
in the study of religion where the subjective and the internal are highlighted to such an extent as to eliminate
even the possibility of an association with an objective
and external reality. According to this line of reasoning, religious experience is explained only in terms of
a subjective issue, with no external referent that may be
called real.3 This approach to religion, which explains
the whole religious phenomenon as a mere sum of its
identifiable anthropological or psychological processes,
is reductive, or in other words, a form of reductionism applied to religion. Ironically, a reductionism of this kind
attempts to make a statement with objective force by explaining everything as subjectively determined.
On the other side of the equation, some forms of religious fundamentalism deny any subjective influence in
the context of religious revelation or inspiration. One
may think, for example, of the orthodox view of Koranic
revelation, in which the prophet Muhammad functions
as a sort of human megaphone selected to report the divine word, which is eternal and uncreated in both content and form. The implication is that even with a different messenger and in a different time and place, the

The Objective and the Subjective

Yet, even when we focus exclusively on divine manifestations in history (miracles, visions, etc.), which are
external and, in a loose sense, objective, it is impossible
to completely transcend the internal subjective dimension of the human being in relation to his or her reception of this external message. As a person listens to
and interprets what the environment, culture, historical
circumstances, and even religious community teach, he
or she will bring personal desires, fears, aspirations, and
general cognitive and emotional frameworks to bear on
the acquisition of this religious content in such a way as
to make it existentially relevant. Furthermore, the individual’s “soul” will further shape this knowledge through
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Koran would have emerged in every detail as exactly the
same text as revealed through Muhammad.4 In Christianity, understandings of revelation that deny the presence of any human filter are found in exclusively literal
readings of the biblical text, with hermeneutical assumptions rooted in scientific positivism.

and differences, and map their characteristics across cultures and across religions. This idea was probably one of
William James’s greatest contributions as he attempted
to complete a collection and interpretation of this very
nature in his Varieties of Religious Experience (1902/2004),
a study that is likely to remain a vital force in the psychology of religion. Still, much more remains to be explored in this area, with studies that would likely need
to consider the socio-psychological and anthropological
dimensions of human life. Indeed, the cognitive study of
religion is a present attempt to deepen our understanding of religious experiences in this particular direction.
The highly popular subject of emotions in phenomenology and psychology also has relevance in this context, as
does the neuro-biological side of its exploration.5
Within this broad framework, psychology and its allied
fields of scientific and socio-scientific knowledge can help
us address several important questions about the nature
and extent of the “religious propensities,” to quote James
(1902/2004). For example, some have recently come to
theorize the existence of a God-gene (Bailey, 1998), while
others have advocated the universal existence of religiosity as a human characteristic that is implicitly manifested
even in a variety of non-religious settings and activities
(Hood, 2009). Clearly, differences continue to exist as
far as explaining or defining the source or utility of these
deep-seated drives. Non-believers often explain the presence of these propensities in terms of a by-product of
natural selection that is made redundant within the milieu of a modern scientific world. In any case, psychology
and other scientific fields of inquiry have at least highlighted the universality of religion and its significance for
humanity at large. By so doing, at least in my opinion,
they have legitimized its study and given some credence
to its claims of transcendence. Thus, we can affirm with
Mircea Eliade (1978) that “the sacred is an element in the
structure of consciousness, and not a stage in the history
of that consciousness” (p. xiii).

Psychology and the Study of Religious Experience

Does this intricate intersection between the external
and internal dimensions of revelation force us to renounce
any claim to objectivity when it comes to the study of religion, and particularly of religious experiences? While
the complex dynamics already referenced should at least
warn us about too facile interpretations and conclusions,
we do not need to go this far. A century after William
James it is now possible to view his desire to develop a
proper scientific study of religion as somewhat naïve because it was excessively rooted in the scientific positivism
of his age. There will always be some dimensions of religion, particularly the metaphysical aspects, that do not lie
within the scope of scientific inquiry and that will require
different epistemic methods and assumptions to be addressed. Yet, even in the context of religious experiences,
there is value in psychological studies that analyze their
patterns or dynamics and reflect upon their significance.
In this context, psychology’s central function is not to
spread doubt on the authenticity of religious experiences.
It can certainly fulfill this purpose when warranted, but
an a priori assumption of this kind would clearly raise
serious questions about the legitimacy of its endeavors.
As others have indicated, the philosophical foundations
employed in interpreting psychological data on religious
phenomena often shape conclusions, sometimes in quite
anti-theistic directions (Slife & Reber, 2009; Nelson &
Slife, 2010). In the present setting, rather than continuing
the critique and engaging the complexity of this discussion I would like to highlight some potential areas of benefit in the “psychological” study of religious experiences.
Specifically, I can think of three primary ways in which
psychology may contribute to the study of religious phenomena of various intensities and claims: a descriptive focus, a pragmatic focus, and a functional-psychoanalytic focus.

The Pragmatic Study of Religious Experience

A second dimension of religion for which psychology
may provide an epistemic contribution is the exploration of the consequences of religious experiences. This
pragmatic dimension, again highly emphasized by William James, is perhaps the most widely observable aspect
of religious experience and therefore particularly favor-

The Descriptive Study of Religious Experience

To begin, psychology can study the extent of revelatory religious manifestations, underline their similarities
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able to scientific analysis. At the same time, if pragmatic
consequences are, on the one hand, somewhat visible, it
is particularly difficult to determine, on the other hand,
whether such consequences should be attributed to religious or to other kinds of experiences and behaviors. In
some cases, such as in studies pertaining to the effect and
consequences of prayer, particular religious behaviors are
isolated from other experiences of the individual (Hood,
2009). In other cases, it is easier to begin by measuring
general levels of religiosity in specific subjects and subsequently analyze the quality and characteristics of individuals’ lives in relation to particular variables of a greater or
lesser general nature. For example, studies have addressed
such variables as mental health, physical health, marital
satisfaction, sociability, and job performance in association with specific degrees of religiosity.6 While it is true
that correlations alone may be extracted from such findings, the findings of these studies may still provide useful
indications about the value of religion in people’s lives.
These studies may also offer valuable information about
forms of religiosity that are generally dysfunctional (such
as extrinsic as opposed to intrinsic religiosity).
In this context it is important to reflect on the extent
to which measures of happiness and health either validate or invalidate a particular religious path of existence.
Indeed, to my knowledge, there is no religion that promises uninterrupted joy or avoidance of illness during this
mortal realm of existence; on the contrary, some religions
emphasize the necessity of suffering and the need to seek
eternal rather than present happiness. An additional
challenge involves the realm of definition. While there is
no question that religious and non-religious people often define happiness differently, it is often the case that
even people of similar religious persuasions hold different views on what it means to be happy. Hence, it is
particularly difficult to recognize a universal standard
of happiness that can be used to measure the pragmatic
consequences of people’s religiosity or of their religious
experiences. We therefore have a normative problem that
underlies a descriptive difficulty. The same challenge is
perhaps even more evident when using mental health as a
standard. In fact, psychology has been a discipline much
more concerned with demarcations of mental illness than
with demarcations of mental health so that creating a
model of the ideal mentally healthy individual is no easy
endeavor. Furthermore, within a religious frame of refer-

ence, it is not a universal expectation that mental health
necessarily accompanies religious life.
Still, there are characteristics in people’s lives that reflect, to some extent, the nature of their religious beliefs
and actions. Certainly, followers of most religions typically possess within themselves some pragmatic measure
of authentication of their religion, which often focuses on
the signs or fruits of belief.7 These measures include actions that reflect essence—doing that manifests being or,
more properly, becoming. Hence, it is only natural that an
individual who serves and loves others will ultimately become a loving individual and that such an attribute will
become apparent in several areas of his or her life. On
the other hand, a person who, for example, quickly moves
from one sexual relationship to the next or who abuses
children while professing belief in Christianity does not
embody the fruits of his faith. Therefore, by measuring
specific areas of people’s lives, including social interactions, emotions, commitments, and coping mechanisms,
psychology may at least bring focus to the gap between
the professed and the actual, or between the ideal and the
real. By so doing, psychology can shed light on positive or
negative patterns of religiosity, and it may often be able
to do so without needing to distance itself from the very
normative framework of the religion at stake.
The Functional-Psychoanalytic Study
of Religious Experience

Closely related to a pragmatic study of religious experience is the functional-psychoanalytic study, which can be
specifically linked with both the revelatory claims of personal religious experience and with the psychoanalytic dimension of psychology. As previously mentioned, since it is possible to identify religious beliefs and behaviors in all cultures
and at all times, it is appropriate to ask whether such naturalness of religion constitutes an advantage or an obstacle to
its very claims and purposes. In other words, does the functional aspect of religion—its fulfillment of internal drives,
aspirations, hesitations, and needs—facilitate or obstruct its
epistemic evaluation or any possible judgments that relate to
its objective nature? Whether or not the question is philosophically (or, more properly, phenomenologically) suitable,
it is certain that psychology, and especially psychoanalysis,
may shed light on religion’s functionality by gathering data
about its functional dynamics and then by proposing a psychoanalytic interpretation of that data.
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Indeed, the core of the issue is the kind and the degree
of religion’s internal functionality rather than the question of functionality itself. If it is possible to view any
kind of psychological functionality as suspect (because it
is potentially associated with psychosis at worst or neurosis at best), then it is also possible, and in my view more
likely, to understand psychological functionality as the
potential foundation of a deeper truth that transcends
rational articulation. By this I mean to say that judging
humanity as being prone or receptive to religious impulses may underlie theistic claims of a God who has created
us as particularly driven to turn to Him and to believe in
Him. At the same time, if religion is shown to be functional in those aspects that are ultimately contradicted
by its claims, such as in fulfilling desires of domination,
strengthening fears of social interactions, or solidifying
self-centered behavior, it is apparent that such psychological dynamics, although real in the sense of reflecting
the true experience of the individual, are at the same time
illusory or mistaken in their explicit association with religious beliefs and claims. Therefore, by judging which internal drives are activated by particular forms of religious
conceptualizations and behavior it may be possible to
begin to form an evaluative picture of these supposedly
religious claims through the psychoanalytic indications
provided by scholarly studies.
In this context I can briefly highlight two scholars who
have contributed significantly to this field of inquiry—
namely Ana-Maria Rizzuto and André Godin. Rizzuto
(1979) has brought focus to the importance of “Godrepresentations” as explained in terms of “the totality of
experiential levels obtained from the life of an individual,
which under the aegis of the human capacity to symbolize are gathered by a person under the name God. The
representation always includes visceral, proprioceptive,
sensorimotor, perceptual, eidetic, and conceptual components” (pp. 122–123). Furthermore, she has followed
Freud in stressing the significance of parental figures for
the child’s earliest development of God’s representations
(although, unlike Freud, she has given more significance
to the mother), has underlined the psychic utility of
such representations for the child’s protection of selfrespect and parental relationships, and has emphasized
the continuation but “elasticity” of God-representations
throughout an individual’s lifetime. Rizzuto has also
recognized that God, as a “transitional object representation,” may be accepted or rejected, because “to believe or

not to believe is always an act of fidelity to oneself and to
our mental representations of those to whom we owe our
past and present existence” (p. 117).
To my knowledge, Rizzuto (1979) does not go beyond this psychological understanding of God to inquire
about its correspondence with external objective reality
(a task that lies beyond the limits of psychology—or of
any science for that matter), although she clearly disagrees with Freud’s evaluation regarding people’s need
to overcome these representations when reaching maturity. Instead, in psychological terms she underlines that
“God is a potentially suitable object, and if updated during each crisis of development, may remain so through
maturity and through the rest of life” (p. 209). In other
words, we need certain kinds of God-representations for
our own mental health because they are psychologically
functional, meaning that they are real within a particular
epistemic framework of reference.
Yet, there remains a fundamental question about a
possible bridge between psychology and theology—or
the lack thereof. Godin (1985) comes to our aid with an
analysis that makes this dimension more explicit as he
critiques those psychological dynamics of religious experiences that specifically clash with accepted Christian
theology. In short, Godin underlines the negative functionality of religion in theological terms and highlights
the degree to which authentic religious experience is in
conflict with natural psychological propensities.
In addressing the magical dimension of belief in God,
which is closely linked to the most elementary kind of religious faith, Godin denounces the concept of a God who
is simply there to punish, to reward, to fulfill our greatest
desires, and to calm our anxieties. He affirms that
such a God . . . is a useful reinforcement of their (the parents’) authority when it falters. In spite of the efforts of an
updated catechesis . . . the great mass of parents, Christians though they may be, continue to use God in this
way. Half bogey-man and half Santa Claus; these roles,
which are hardly appropriate to the God of the Gospels
. . . help to transmit elements of what we must call a folklore Christianity. . . . In many ancient societies religious
myths fulfilled this function of supporting the existing
social power. On this point the resistance to a specific
character for the Christian God . . . is and will continue to
be very strong. From a psychological point of view, man
thus appears to be spontaneously religious but is far from
being spontaneously Christian. (Godin, 1985, p. 21)
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Thus, Godin advocates the need for the growth and
development of one’s faith—a faith that must transcend
its most elementary impulses and become mature in line
with its theological and scriptural conceptualizations.
Clearly, the criteria of authenticity applied will vary in
relation to the specific religious doctrines and claims
that form the beliefs of the individual. This is not a matter of imposing one particular religious perspective in
evaluating psychological dynamics of all religious experiences. The point is one of internal consistency where
religious experiences are squared against the theological framework that is supposed to explain them as opposed to a supposedly superior interpretative framework of a scientific kind. Godin, as a Jesuit speaking
to other Christians, obviously made use of a Christian
theological perspective in his psychoanalytic analysis of
Christian religious experiences, but Muslims, Hindus,
or Buddhists may do the same by employing their own
religious framework of reference.

interaction with the epistemic/ontological foundations of
the religious views under examination. Godin provides a
useful example in this direction because, while building
his analysis on psychoanalytic insights, he makes use of
Christian theology (his own interpretation of it, to be sure,
but one that is hardly controversial) to discern and evaluate between positive and negative religious experiences.
As a person with a passionate interest in dialogue,
whether among different religions, cultures, or philosophies, or between religion and science (and religion and
psychology in particular), I have come to recognize the
centrality of mutual respect in both interpersonal relationships and interdisciplinary communicative endeavors. Yet,
religion has not always been respectful of psychology and
psychology has not always been respectful of religion or
of religious experiences. In this article I have attempted
to highlight some general principles in the psychological
study of religious experiences that emphasize the potential
usefulness of psychology without suggesting its hegemony
or epistemic imposition. To be sure, many more details
need to be worked out at the micro level of interaction.
Still, it is the broader theoretical picture or the macro level
of explanation that usually shapes and informs attitudes
and approaches in engaging interdisciplinary studies of all
kinds, and the interaction between religion and psychology is certainly no exception.

Conclusion

The relationship between psychology and religious experience clearly requires extensive examination, which obviously lies beyond the scope of a single article. Yet, even
though I have only scratched the surface of the subject,
I hope to have provided some useful analytical foundations that may be employed for the continuing exploration
of this fascinating area of study. Psychology may indeed
come into dialogue with religion and assist in shedding
light on the dynamics of religious experiences. It can do
so by analyzing the nature and scope of their manifestations (the descriptive study), by studying the consequences associated with their expressions (the pragmatic study),
and by engaging their function within the psyche of the
individual vis-à-vis the normative ideals of the specific religious framework of explanation that the individual has
embraced (the functional-psychoanalytic study). Therefore, any evaluative statement on the reality, truth, benefit,
or goodness of any religious beliefs and behaviors may not
take place while wholly transcending the framework of
reference advocated by that religious perspective. Indeed,
since both psychology and religion propose, more or less
explicitly, a particular descriptive and normative worldview, it is not appropriate for psychology to apply its own
epistemic and normative assumptions on religious experiences without at least bringing those assumptions into
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Endnotes

6.	 On religion and health, see Hood et al. (2009, pp. 437–444). On
religion, work, and marriage, see Hood et al. (2009, pp. 158–173).

1.	 This soul-like entity is then further elevated from its natural
position through more direct divine interventions. Examples
of such religious conceptualizations include the concept of
redemptive grace in Christianity (theosis in Eastern Christian

7.	 See Matthew 7:16, 21; Mark 16:17; and Galatians 5:22 in the
New Testament for examples of the source of this idea within
Christianity.
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